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"Instinct with an Obligation"




In an obscure turn-of-the-century opinion, a little-known judge of an
intermediate appellate court in New York described an employment agreement
as "instinct with... an obligation" on the employer's part not to terminate an
employee during the six-year duration of the agreement, despite conceding that
the contract did not expressly bind the employer to the term. 1 From these
modest origins, twentieth-century contract jurisprudence has seen the flowering
of the principle that an agreement or relation can be "instinct with an
obligation" and therefore enforceable despite failing to satisfy formal
requirements. No less a judge than Benjamin Cardozo frequently called on the
instinct language in New York Court of Appeals opinions, and he even brought
it with him to the United States Supreme Court.2 In addition, other judges and
theorists increasingly employed the phrase to support a wide array of
arguments, such as the soundness of a particular statutory interpretation, the
validity of employing equitable principles, or the appropriateness of expanding
or diminishing express contract terms.3 The instinct language has even
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School. I wish to thank Professors Peter Alces, Kevin Clermont and Julian McDonnell
and Judge Richard Posner for their very helpful comments on earlier drafts, and
participants at a faculty seminar at Cornell Law School for their insights. Rick Ball
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I McCall Co. v. Wright, 117 N.Y.S. 775, 779 (App. Div. 1909) (Scott, J.), aff'd,
91 N.E. 516 (N.Y. 1910).
2 See, e.g., Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294,
319 (1933) (statute "instinct with the recognition of a duty"); Nixon v. Condon, 286
U.S. 73, 87 (1932) (Texas Supreme Court case "instinct with the concession"); Jarl
Co. v. Village of Croton-On-Hudson, 179 N.E. 708, 710 (N.Y. 1932) (opinion
"instinct with the assumption"); Sinclair v. Purdy, 139 N.E. 255, 258 (N.Y. 1923)
(language setting up a trust "instinct with an obligation"); Ward v. Erie R.R.,129
N.E. 886, 888 (N.Y. 1921) (statute "instinct with plan and purpose"), cert. denied,
256 U.S. 696 (1921).
3 For cases involving statutory construction, see Heard v. Cuomo, 610 N.E.2d
348 (N.Y. 1993); Hendrickson v. Griggs, 672 F. Supp. 1126, 1133-37 (N.D. Iowa
1987), appeal dismissed, 856 F.2d 1041 (8th Cir. 1988). In Hendrickson, the court
found an implied duty on the part of states that accept federal funds to meet federal
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transcended national boundaries. 4
Most important, "instinct with an obligation" has helped kindle two major
enlargements of twentieth-century contract liability. First, the phrase presented
a justification for extinguishing the requirement of "mutuality of obligation," a
previously entrenched barrier to the enforceability of agreements, which
required express language binding both parties. Second, in what one writer has
called the most "significant protection of non-union employees" during this
century, 5 the instinct language helped create a new non-consensual employer
obligation to terminate employees only for cause.6
statutory requirements for the detention of juveniles. Hendrickson, 672 F. Supp at
1333-35. The court noted that, "[a]s usual, Congress 'has voiced its wishes in muted
strains and left it to the courts to discern the theme' indirectly." Id. at 1133 (quoting
Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970)). Nevertheless, "for reasons best stated by
Judge Cardozo, the Court finds a duty without asking whether Iowa formally promised
to comply with these requirements.... [The federal statute] is instinct with an
obligation by any reasonable reading of the statute and its regulations." Hendrickson,
672 F. Supp. at 1135 n.13 (citations omitted); see also Fenning v. American Type
Founders, 109 A.2d 689, 694 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1954), certification denied,
122 A.2d 528 (N.J. 1956); Joseph F. Mittleman Corp. v. Murray L. Spies Corp., 129
N.Y.S.2d 822 (Sup. Ct. 1954) (equitable principles); sources cited infra notes 87-102
and accompanying text (contract terms).
For theoretical work using or discussing instinct language, see, Michael Ansaldi,
Texaco, Pennzoil and the Revolt of the Masses: A Contracts Postmortem, 27 Hous. L.
REv. 733, 796-97 (1990) (instinct used to interpret press release); Michael J.
Cozzillio, The Athletic Scholarship and the College National Letter of Intent: A
Contract by Any Other Name, 35 WAYNE L. REv. 1275, 1337 n.240 (1989) (instinct
used to interpret letter of intent).
4 See, e.g., Dawson v. Helicopter Exploration Co., 1955 S.C.R. 868, 875 (Can.
1955).
5 Todd M. Shaughnessy, Johnson v. Morton Thiokol and Handbook Disclaimers:
Allowing Employers to Have Their Cake and Eat It Too, 1992 UTAH L. REV. 1065,
1075 (1992).
6 See infra notes 110-38 and accompanying text. Cardozo probably expected the
expansion of the approach: "Write an opinion, and read it a few years later when it is
dissected in the briefs of counsel. You will learn for the first time the limitations of the
powers of speech, or, if not those of speech in general, at all events your
own.... One marvels sometimes at the ingenuity with which texts the most remote
are made to serve the ends of the argument or parable." Benjamin N. Cardozo, Law
and Literature, and Other Essays and Addresses, in SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENjAMIN
NATHAN CARDOZO, THE CHOICE OF TYCHO BRAHE 341-42 (Margaret E. Hall ed.
1947); see also Zechariah Chafee, Jr., The Disorderly Conduct of Words, 41 CoLuM.
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This essay analyzes the use of "instinct with an obligation," accounts for
its success, and evaluates its impact. I make the effort, in part, to underscore
the significance and power of instinct reasoning in contract jurisprudence. I will
show that the approach shares importance with, and many of the attributes of,
the standards of good faith and unconscionability. Unlike those heavily
analyzed standards, however, "instinct with an obligation" has never been the
focus of study and is only sporadically mentioned in contract literature,
although it is central in a host of cases. 7 The evolution of the use of instinct
reasoning also reflects the experience of twentieth-century contract law and
therefore sheds light on the nature and formal attributes of that law.
In addition, a study of how courts invented, validated, and expanded the
use of "instinct with an obligation" helps elucidate the role of rhetoric in
contract jurisprudence, a subject recently invigorated by Judge Richard Posner
in his book on Cardozo. 8 Posner attributes Cardozo's fame to the power of his
L. REv. 381, 404 0941).
7 A Westlaw search reveals that the phrase has been used in over 300 state and
federal cases up to early 1995. In a remarkable series of lectures presented at The
Ohio State University Law School, later turned into a book, Professor Grant Gilmore
called such cases "case law undergrounds." GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF
CONTRACT 56 (1974). Kessler and Fine devoted a page to "instinct with an obligation"
in their landmark 1964 article on culpa in contrahendo. Friedrich Kessler & Edith
Fine, Culpa in Contrahendo, Bargaining in Good Faith, and Freedom of Contract: A
Comparative Study, 77 HARV. L. REV. 401, 425 (1964). They did little more,
however, than to relate the facts of Wood v. Lucy, Lady-Duff Gordon, 118 N.E. 214
(N.Y. 1917), set forth the instinct paragraph, and call efforts by courts in cases such
as Wood, "remarkable creativity." Kessler & Fine, supra, at 425.
8 RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDozo A STUDY IN REPUTATION (1990). The quotation
about rhetorical power in the title of this article is Judge Posner's. Id. at ix. The topic
of law and language is burgeoning. See generally LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE
LANGUAGE OF JUDGES (1993); THE RHETORIC OF LAW (Austin Sarat & Thomas R.
Kearns eds., 1994) (and authorities cited therein); Brenda Danet, Language in the
Legal Process, 14 L. & Soc'y. REv. 445 (1980).
Rhetoric has several meanings. See James Boyd White, Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric
as Law: The Art of Cultural and Communal Life, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 684, 687 (1985).
In this article I use rhetoric to refer to the style or strategy of an argument or reason
as opposed to its substance, merits, or logic. A rhetorical argument is "grounded on
terms which are contestable, and whose content and authority are created through
interpretive argument, rather than existing prior to it." Kathryn Abrams, The
Unbearable Lightness of Being Stanley Fish, 47 STAN. L. REv. 595, 596 (1995)
(reviewing STANLEY FISH, THERE'S No SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH AND IT'S A GOOD
THING, Too (1994)). I shall refer to "instinct reasoning" when considering the
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rhetoric-to the effectiveness of the strategy and style of his arguments-more
than to the substance and logic of his opinions. Posner adds, however, that
powerful rhetoric in the law is controversial. 9 I study "instinct with an
obligation," an example of rhetorical power, in part to shed additional light on
the value and role of rhetoric in contract law.
Part II of this Article traces the rise and expansion of instinct language and
explains its appeal. On the one hand, I show that courts took up the reasoning
because it dispenses with formal barriers to enforcement and authorizes courts
to base decisions on implication, context, and the equities. It also helped courts
bridge the murky divide between assent-based and non-consensual theories of
obligation. In these regards, instinct reasoning shares many attributes with
other contract-law safety valves such as good faith and unconscionability. On
the other hand, courts were also attracted to "instinct with an obligation"
because of the rhetorical power of the phrase. The language is an unusual and
memorable departure from ordinary English, but it still manages to capture an
idea tersely and concisely. Instinct rhetoric also is unhesitating and unyielding,
ascribing to its user apparent, if not real, certitude. Such an eloquent display of
confidence not only disarms skeptics, but also diminishes any dissonance in its
user.
Part I of this Article considers the implications of the flourishing of
"instinct with an obligation." The cases reaffirm the shared and continuously
evolving role of principles supporting the exercise of private preferences and
principles legitimizing intervention in private agreements such as fairness,
equality, morality, and efficiency. Moreover, the instinct cases underscore the
triumph of contract standards that temper the rigidity of rules, authorize a deep
contextual analysis, and invoke the equities of a case. Despite the ascendancy
of standards and the plethora of contract principles, decisions employing
instinct reasoning illustrate that, for the most part, contract decisions are not ad
hoc; they are constrained by the bounds of the assent paradigm, the
implications of context, the norms of the relevant community, and the criteria
developed by courts under the common law process.
Utilizing the instinct language as a paradigm, Part III also evaluates the
role of rhetoric in the development of contract law. The precise question
addressed is whether courts' use of instinct rhetoric instead of, for example, the
substance or logic of the cases using the phrase and "instinct rhetoric" when focusing
on the language's composition and style.
9 POSNER, supra note 8, at ix-x. Rhetoric "embraces all verbal methods of
persuasion, including the emotive and the deceitful, [therefore] the normative
implications of 'powerful rhetoric' are equivocal." Id. at 54.
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language of implied terms or reasonable expectations, has made any difference.
Does the rhetoric illuminate judicial reasoning or distort or camouflage it?
Does it affect results? For better or worse?
I conclude that instinct rhetoric has contributed to clearer decisions because
the language succinctly captures and conveys the idea that courts should engage
in a deep contextual analysis in deciding contract cases. In addition, more often
than not, courts seem to feel inspired or, perhaps, challenged by the language
to explain and justify why the context is "instinct with an obligation."
Occasionally, however, the rhetoric seems to substitute for elaboration.
Ultimately, it is difficult to say whether courts would have decided any
cases differently were it not for the availability and use of instinct rhetoric. The
social, economic, and psychological forces that influenced courts to create and
nurture instinct reasoning probably would have led them to invent other
language or to focus more on existing doctrines to achieve their purposes.
Instinct rhetoric may thus be more an effect than a cause of legal change.
I suspect, however, that instinct rhetoric did help courts break with the
past. It facilitated, perhaps even hastened, the validation and proliferation of
new, mostly helpful ways of thinking about and deciding contract cases. The
value of rhetoric is inevitably controversial, however, because it can draw
attention to, and therefore propagate, not only valuable ideas but bankrupt ones
as well.
II. THE RISE OF "INSTINCT w IH AN OBLIGATION"
A. Creation
Near the turn of the century, under the doctrine of mutuality of obligation,
an enforceable contract required express promissory language binding each
party to the other. 10 If a purported agreement did not specify a quantity, a time
for performance, or otherwise make the nature of a promisor's obligation clear,
courts declined to enforce the agreement even if the circumstances suggested
that the parties intended to be bound. For example, a court would refuse to
enforce an agreement requiring a buyer to purchase all of its coal from a seller
if the buyer did not promise to use any coal.II Although rigid, the doctrine of
mutuality of obligation was clear and predictable and conformed well to local,
short-term commercial relations, in which the parties could clearly express their
10 See, e.g., Schubert v. Woodward, 167 F. 47 (8th Cir. 1909).
11 See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CoNTRAcrs 76 (2d ed. 1990).
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mutual obligations. 12
Courts began to override the mutuality of obligation doctrine for at least
two reasons. First, methods of doing business began to change as improved
transportation and communication supported the growth of multistate
corporations and the rise of national markets. 13 To participate in these new,
uncertain markets, businesses sought agreements of longer duration to stabilize
sources of supply, prices, and demand. 14 Yet, ironically, the likelihood of
changed conditions increased with the duration of agreements, thereby limiting
the possibility of allocating all of the risks in these new contracts. Parties to
these agreements therefore began to leave terms open and to rely on the
cooperation, flexibility, and good faith of their contracting partner. 15 Courts
began to recognize that parties entered these contracts "with the purpose that
they shall be performed" 16 and that barring such contracts would stifle
entrepreneurial activity that was opening markets and creating new products on
a nationwide scale. 17 Courts therefore began to infer mutual obligations when a
12 See Walter F. Pratt, Jr., American Contract Law at the Turn of the Century, 39
S.C. L. REV. 415, 416-17 (1988).
13 See Marrinan Medical Supply, Inc. v. Ft. Dodge Serum Co., 47 F.2d 458, 460
(8th Cir. 1931).14 Pratt, supra note 12, at 417 (1988); see also Marrinan Medical Supply, 47 F.2d
458 (one of the first federal cases to rely on the "instinct with obligation" language).
While determining whether a complicated commission sales and exclusive licensing
contract for anti-hog cholera serum was valid, the Marrinan Medical Supply court
stated:
But in recent times, the real or supposed needs and exigencies of business
and the ingenuity of business men and their lawyers have evolved a class of
contracts which have the earmarks of both sales contracts [these would not be
subject to ongoing conditions as they were merely executory] and factorage
contracts [subject to ongoing obligations]. It is not easy to determine into which
class a particular contract falls.
Id. at 460.
15 See, e.g., Robert A. Hillman, Court Adjustment of Long Term Contracts: An
Analysis Under Modern Contract Law, 1987 DuKEL. J. 1.16 Marrinan Medical Supply, 47 F.2d at 462.
17 Pratt, supra note 12, at 442. See also Kane v. Chrysler Corp., 80 F. Supp.
360, 363 (D. Del. 1948), which stated:
Contracts such as here involved are neither pure sales nor pure agency
contracts. They have been developed to meet the distribution needs of
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contract did not expressly create them, so long as the overall circumstances
including custom, prior dealings, and the writings evidenced an intent to
contract. 18
Second, the mutuality of obligation approach began to wane because it
created formal barriers to enforcement at a time when formalism was losing
favor. Influenced by the nineteenth-century analytic method, 19 the formalists
had concluded that courts mechanically deduced the appropriate decision from
previously constructed legal categories and rules. 20 The legal realists, on the
other hand, perceived that courts based their decisions not on abstract legal
rules, but on the pragmatic evaluation of the particular facts and equities. 21
Freed from the conceptual shackles of formalism, courts escalated their
enforcement of agreements when they believed the parties intended to contract
even if the agreement lacked express promissory language and, therefore,
lacked mutuality of obligation. 22
"Instinct with an obligation" provided fresh, aesthetically pleasing, and
interesting language that authorized a flexible contextual analysis23 It therefore
constructed an attractive channel through which the courts could effectuate the
new approach to mutuality issues. The language first appeared in McCall Co.
manufactured products where such distribution cannot be had upon merit alone. In
many cases the product or model is new and the sales must be encouraged by
expensive show rooms, service stations and by intensive and extensive advertising
and salesmanship.... The contracts are entered into in good faith by both parties
and utilized by business men and must be given a construction in accordance with
the intent of the parties.
Id. at 363.
18 See, e.g., Marrinan Medical Supply, 47 F.2d at 462; Ehrenworth v. George F.
Stuhmer & Co., 128 N.E. 108, 110 (N.Y. 1920); Wood v. Lucy, Lady-Duff Gordon,
118 N.E. 214, 215 (N.Y. 1917); O'Connor v. Bankers Trust Co., 289 N.Y.S. 252,
274 (Sup. Ct. 1936), aff'd, 1 N.Y.S.2d 641 (App. Div. 1937), aff'd, 16 N.E.2d 302
(N.Y. 1938) (per curiam).
19 Girardeau A. Spann, A Critical Legal Studies Perspective on Contract Law and
Practice, 1988 ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 223, 226.
20 See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis Critiquing Critical
Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L. Rnv. 462, 496 1987).
21 Spann, supra note 19, at 227.
22 See, e.g., T.B. Walker Mfg. Co. v. Swift & Co., 200 F. 529 (5th Cir. 1912);
Golden Cycle Mining Co. v. Rapson Coal Mining Co., 188 F. 179, 182-83 (8th Cir.
1911).
2 See infra notes 53-65 and accompanying text.
1995]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
v. Wright,24 discussed in the introduction. Judge Scott, writing for the New
York Appellate Division, apparently coined the phrase since it was absent from
both briefs. McCall Co., engaged in producing dress patterns and publishing
fashion magazines, had employed Wright in various capacities for three
years-25 During that period his knowledge of the business, including its trade
secrets, increased, and he gained responsibility.26 Wright then broke an
employment contract between the parties, but shortly thereafter returned to
McCall's employ under a new contract. 27 This contract included a six-year
term, reserving McCall Co. a right to terminate upon thirty days' notice.28 The
contract also set forth "an increasing scale of compensation" and a covenant
not to compete. 29 Wright nevertheless quickly joined a competitor, and McCall
Co. sought an injunction restraining Wright from working elsewhere. 30 The
court found merit in McCall Co.'s request. Responding directly to Wright's
claim that the contract lacked mutuality of obligation, Judge Scott conceded that
McCall Co. did not "by precise words engage to employ [Wright] for the term
specified," but nonetheless found the "whole contract" to be "instinct with
such an obligation." 3'
The court's conclusion that McCall Co. agreed to be bound to a six-year
term appears correct in light of the contract's specification of a six-year
duration.32 Moreover, McCall Co. may have been willing to commit itself to a
long-term arrangement in light of Wright's apparent value to the firm and his
questionable allegiance to it. Regrettably, Judge Scott did not elaborate on these
themes, referring only to his conclusion as a "fair construction" of the
agreement.33 At its birth, then, the instinct language substituted for elaboration,
not a good sign if a goal of judicial decisions is certainty, clarity, and
predictability.
At any rate, the attractiveness of "instinct with an obligation" did not
escape Judge Cardozo, who used the language for the first time in Moran v.
24 117 N.Y.S. 775 (N.Y. App. Div. 1909), aff'd, 91 N.E. 516 (N.Y. 1910).
25 Id. at 776.
26 Id.




31 Id. at 779.
32 McCall Co. also reserved the right to terminate upon thirty days notice, but the
court found that the clause did not destroy the mutuality of obligation. Id.
33 Id.
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Standard Oil CO.3 4 The language was probably brought to Cardozo's attention
by Moran's brief to the New York Court of Appeals, which quoted McCall
Co.'s use of "instinct." 35 Moran expressly agreed to sell Standard Oil's paint
for five years in return for commissions on sales "to be made," but Standard
Oil did not expressly agree to employ Moran for five years.36 When Standard
Oil refused to supply paint, Moran sought damages.37 The trial court held in
favor of Standard Oil because the contract "did not impose on [Standard Oil] a
duty to employ" Moran for five years.38 On appeal, Cardozo found an implied
obligation to do so, stating:
[The law] does not look for the precise balance of phrase, promise matched
against promise in perfect equilibrium.... There are times when reciprocal
engagements do not fit each other like the parts of an indented deed, and yet
the whole contract, as was said in McCall Co. v. Wright, may be "instinct
with... an obligation" imperfectly expressed. 39
Judge Cardozo was more careful than Judge Scott in explaining why the
agreement was "instinct with an obligation" on Standard Oil's part. Cardozo
argued that the court should not infer that the parties would have entered a one-
sided agreement permitting Standard Oil to terminate at will, especially after
assurances by Standard Oil's lawyers that Moran's future was "secure" for five
years 4° Moreover, the provision for the payment of commissions on sales "to
be made" to Moran meant that Standard Oil must have had a duty to supply the
product to Moran so that he could make sales and earn commissions.41 Moran
also had agreed to sell Standard Oil's paint for five years, something he could
not do unless Standard Oil supplied the paint.42 In addition, the parties called
their writing an "agreement," which suggested that each party had committed
itself.43 Finally, Standard Oil had not sought a termination-at-will clause,
34 105 N.E. 217 (N.Y. 1914).35 Brief for the Respondent-Appellant at 36, Moran v. Standard Oil Co., 105
N.E. 217 (N.Y. 1914).36 Moran, 105 N.E. at 218-19.
3 7 1d.
38 Id. at 220.
39 Id. at 221 (citation omitted) (quoting McCall Co. v. Wright, 117 N.Y.S. 775,
779 (App. Div. 1909), aft'd, 91 N.E. 516 (N.Y. 1910)).
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suggesting that it was content with a five-year obligation. 44
Cardozo's reasoning may have been correct as to the parties' intentions,
although most of the factors he mentioned could be explained without finding
that Standard Oil had agreed to be bound for five years. For example, the
parties may have intended the term providing for commissions on sales "to be
made" to come into play only when sales were made and commissions earned
prior to Standard Oil's termination, not to guarantee Moran a right to earn
commissions for five years. Moreover, neither Moran's five-year commitment,
nor the writing's label as an "agreement," is very compelling; the parties could
have "agreed" only that Moran would sell paint for five years unless Standard
Oil terminated first. Cardozo may have been moved primarily by the perceived
unfairness of a unilateral commitment by Moran.
Judge Cardozo returned to the "instinct with an obligation" language in
Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon.45 Cardozo wrote that Lucy, "a creator of
fashions," whose "certificate of approval" was valuable to dress manufacturers,
was bound to a contract in which she had given Wood the exclusive right to
place her endorsements on dress designs and to sell her own designs, even
though Wood had not expressly promised to do anything. 46 Cardozo found an
implied obligation on Wood's part to use reasonable efforts, reasoning that
Lucy would not otherwise have given Wood an exclusive right in which her
only compensation was half the profits.47 Cardozo stated that "the law has
outgrown its primitive stage of formalism when the precise word was the
sovereign talisman, and every slip was fatal." 48 Instead, "[a] promise may be
lacking, and yet the whole writing may be 'instinct with an obligation,'
imperfectly expressed." 49
Wood v. Lucy ensured a place for the instinct aphorism in contract
jurisprudence.50 First, in light of Lucy's grant of an exclusive agency, it is a
more compelling case than Moran for finding that Wood actually agreed to use
44 d. at 221.
45 118 N.E. 214, 214 (N.Y. 1917).
46 Id.
47 Id. at 214-15.
48 Id. at 214.
49 Id.
50 Cardozo's attention may have been drawn to the phrase by Lucy's brief, which
cited Moran for the general proposition that a contract required mutuality.
Respondent's Brief at 12, Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y.
1917). This was poor strategy, of course, because the holding of Moran supported
Wood's position.
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reasonable efforts to market Lucy's designs (Why would Lucy convey an
exclusive agency, if Wood had no obligation?). Instinct language therefore
supplied a rationale for courts to do what they believed they were supposed to
do, namely enforce the parties' intentions when they were "imperfectly
expressed." Second, the case was interesting, even colorful. Lucy characterized
the changing role of women and marketing in a new economic system. Yet the
facts are simple and straightforward. It is no surprise that the case became a
favorite of casebook editors and treatise writers.51 Third, Cardozo, a well-
known and respected judge, wrote with his usual flair, taking up the instinct
language in the heart of the opinion. Cardozo was so effective in incorporating
the phrase, in fact, that commentators sometimes forgot that the language was
not his own.52
Perhaps most important, "instinct with an obligation" gained prominence
after Wood v. Lucy because of the rhetorical appeal of the phrase. Somewhat
antiquated and unusual even at the time, it was an exciting divergence from
ordinary English. Instead of drab language of implied terms or reasonable
expectations (for example, "from the circumstances we can imply an intention
to contract"), instinct rhetoric was a charming and pleasant alternative.53
Instinct rhetoric also appealed because, like good poetry, it evoked
meaning on several levels. According to the literal meaning of the language, a
relation is "instinct with an obligation" when it is "infused" or "imbued"54 or
"filled or charged"55 with an obligation. An obligation is "something that
[commits] one to a course of action." 56 A relation could be "filled or charged"
with an obligation, then, for many reasons. The use of the word "instinct" in
51 The case was picked up as early as 1921. See, e.g., ARTHuR L. CORBIN, CASES
ON THE LAW OF CONTRACr § 309 (lst ed. 1921); GEORGE P. COSTIGAN, JR., CASES ON
THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 467 (1st ed. 1921); see also SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTs, 8104 n.18 (4th ed. 1936). It is now found in numerous
contracts casebooks.
5 2 See, e.g., David Charny, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of
Contract Interpretation, 89 MIcH. L. REv. 1815, 1825 (1991); Peter Linzer, The
Decline of Assent: At-Will Employment as a Case Study of the Breakdown of Private
Law Theory, 20 GA. L. REv. 323, 386 (1986).
53 Legal terms can have "charm as verbal antiques or esoteric catchwords." Carl
S. Smith, Law as Form and Theme in American Letters: An Essay in Law and
American Literature, in LAW AND AMERICAN LITERATURE 1, 8 (1983). Of course, legal
writing "serve[s] more sharply defined social needs than does literature." Id. at 7.
5 4 WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICrIONARY 599 (1976).
55 WEBSTER'S NEw UNrERSAL UNABRIDOED DIcrIoNARY 951 (2d ed. 1979).
56 WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 792 (1976).
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the phrase also evokes an alternative meaning. An "instinct" is a "natural or
inherent aptitude, impulse, or capacity," 57 suggesting that the obligation
isolated by the court arises "naturally" from the environment.58
Notwithstanding its multiple meanings, instinct rhetoric also appeared
disarmingly simple. The language had the "terseness and tang of the proverb,
and the maxim." 59 Unlike ordinary "legalese," "characterized by passive
verbs, impersonality, nominalizations, long sentences, idea-stuffed sentences,
difficult words, double negatives, [and] illogical order," 60 instinct rhetoric was
short, direct, and accessible. It therefore produced a "sense of fellowship
awakened when judges talk in ways that seem to make us partners in the
deliberative process." 61  Moreover, it decreased the possibility of
misunderstanding and error. 62
Instinct rhetoric was also forceful and confident, containing "sincerity and
fire." 63 An agreement "instinct with an obligation," was so "filled or charged"
or "infused" with a duty that no reasonable person could doubt the obligation.
Use of the language demonstrated Cardozo's utter confidence in the existence
of a duty, helping to persuade the reader to discount contradictory evidence.64
57 Id. at 599.
58 Technically "instinct" may not be a metaphor but a statement of principle. On
the other hand, the principle is expressed metaphorically in the sense that it describes
a contract as though it were alive. Metaphors in the law include "penumbras that
protect privacy; sliding scales that do and do not assure equality; a marketplace of
ideas... and.even dreadful fruit from [a] poisonous tree." Robert K. L. Collins,
Legal Metaphors Shape Our Vision of the Law, NAT'L. L.J. May 23, 1994, at A19,
A20; see also Burr Henly, "Penumbra%". The Roots of Legal Metaphor, 15 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 81, 81 0987) ("slippery slopes, bright and blurred lines, constitutional
foothills, scales of justice, level playing fields, and a wall of separation between
church and state.") (citations omitted).
59 Cardozo, supra note 6, at 342.
60 Robert W. Benson, The End of Legalese: The Game Is Over, 13 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & SoC. CHANGE 519, 531 (1984-85. Mellinkoff states that the language of the law
tends to be "wordy... unclear.., pompous... [and] dull." DAVID MELLINKOFF,
THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAW 24 0963).
61 Cardozo, supra note 6, at 346. "As precision is the loudest virtue of the
language of the law.., so wordiness is its noisiest vice." Mellinkoff, supra note 60,
at 399.
62 MELLINKOFF, supra note 60, at 402-04. For another discussion of the artful
use of a single sentence, see POSNER, supra note 8, at 56.
63 Cardozo, supra note 6, at 342.
64 This has been called "assertive rhetoric" in that it "aims to close off
questioning and doubt and to exclude the possibility of competing claims." Mary L.
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Moreover, instinct rhetoric camouflaged the court's flexibility by appearing to
confine decisions to existing obligations that simply needed to be liberated from
the contextual web, thereby mollifying or disarming critics of judicial
activism. 65
B. Expansion
After Wood, "instinct with an obligation" began to take solid root. Judge
Cardozo drew upon the rhetoric not only in contract cases, but when faced with
a gap in a trust, statute, or precedent. 66 As with Moran and Wood v. Lucy, he
employed the language to draw together disparate sources of contextual
evidence to extract the core meaning.67 More important, Cardozo's opinions
usually, but not always, were persuasive on what the evidence meant.68
Other New York judges followed Cardozo's lead, employing instinct
language in cases involving both written and oral contracts when the parties
apparently intended to contract but the expression of their intent was
"imperfect." 69 Relying in no small part on the instinct language, courts all but
Dudziak, Oliver Wendell Holmes as a Eugenic Reformer: Rhetoric in the Writing of
Consitutional Law, 71 IOWA L. REV. 833, 859 (1986). Notwithstanding this
characteristic of instinct rhetoric, I argue later that the language inspired courts to
explain their results. See discussion infra part lI.B. and accompanying notes.
65 "The strength that is born of form and the feebleness that is born of the lack of
form are in truth qualities of the substance. They are tokens of the thing's identity.
They make it what it is." Cardozo, supra note 6, at 340.
66 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 2.
67 "In the end there must be a synthesis that will bring the severed parts
together." Marchant v. Mead-Morrison Mfg. Co., 169 N.E. 386, 391 (N.Y. 1929),
appeal dismissed, 282 U.S. 801 (1930). Cardozo used other rhetoric to describe this
methodology such as "pregnant with the assumption." Id. at 390; see also cases cited
supra note 2.
68 See, e.g., Marchant, 169 N.E. 386; Sinclair v. Purdy, 139 N.E. 252 (N.Y.
1923); Ward v. Erie R.R., 129 N.E. 886 (N.Y. 1921), cert. denied, 256 U.S. 696
(1921).
69 See e.g., Ehrenworth v. George F. Stuhmer & Co., 128 N.E. 108, 110 (N.Y.
1920); Dairymen's League Co-Op. Ass'n v. Holmes, 202 N.Y.S. 663, 669 (App.
Div.1924), aff'd, 147 N.E. 171 (N.Y. 1924 ); In re Brunswick's Estate, 256 N.Y.S.
879, 884-85 (Sup. Ct. 1932); Renner v. John T. Stanley Co., -240 N.Y.S. 148, 149
(Sup. Ct. 1930).
New York courts did place some limits on the use of the instinct language. For
example, one court declined to find that an employee's agreement to forgo a tort claim
was "instinct with an obligation" on the part of the employer to pay a lifetime pension
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repudiated the principle that a contract could be unenforceable for
indefiniteness. 70 In such cases, courts generally examined the business context
to determine whether the parties intended to contract and the terms of the
contract, but the resolution of these issues was not always persuasive.
In O'Connor v. Bankers Trust Co.,71 for example, the court found a
contractual obligation in very general oral and written promises and assurances
to insure the bank deposits of a failing bank made during the heart of the
depression by the chairman of the Clearing House committee, a group of New
York banks, to the comptroller of the currency and the president of the failing
bank.72 The committee feared that closing the bank would add to the existing
panic and cause a run on other banks.73 The chairman told the president that
the Clearing House members would "stand behind him one hundred per
cent." 74 He wrote similar assurances to the comptroller.75 Although these
communications contained no details as to how the Clearing House members
proposed to stand behind the failing bank, no time for performance, and no
formula for apportionment of payments among members, the court still
remarked that "the conversations... were with contractual intent. They were
more than mere promises to enter into some contractual engagement in the
future; they were 'instinct with an obligation.'... No contract is rejected for
indefiniteness whose purpose is so clear..... 'Indefiniteness must reach the
point where construction becomes futile.'" 76 The court therefore "found" that
the member banks could use their discretion in determining how to pay the
failing bank's debts, that they were obliged to do so in a reasonable time, and
to the injured employee. The court held that the employee had not intended to make a
claim against her employer even though she had received the alleged life-long pension
for seven years. Harvey v. J.P. Morgan & Co., 25 N.Y.S.2d 636, 636 (App. Term
1938) (per curiam), aff'd, 23 N.Y.S.2d. 960 (App. Div. 1940); see also Saltzman v.
Barson, 205 N.Y.S. 548, 549 (App. Div. 1924) (document lacking in characteristics
that would make it "instinct with obligation"), rev'd in part, 146 N.E. 618 (N.Y.
1925).
70 See, e.g., James Talcott, Inc. v. Marshall Field & Co., 15 N.Y.S.2d 846 (Sup.
Ct. 1939), af0'd, 17 N.Y.S.2d 1020 (App. Div. 1940).
71 289 N.Y.S. 252 (Sup. Ct. 1936), aff'd, 1 N.Y.S.2d 641 (App. Div: 1937),
aft'd, 16 N.E.2d 302 (N.Y. 1938) (per curiam).
72 Id. at 265-69.
73 Id. at 260-62.
74 1d. at 263.
75 d. at 263-64.
76 Id. at 273-74 (citations omitted) (in part quoting Cardozo, J. in Cohen & Sons
v. M. Lurie Woolen Co., 133 N.E. 370, 371 (N.Y. 1921)).
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that liability was to be apportioned on the basis of the amount of each bank's
capital finds.77
The perhaps overheated use of "instinct with an obligation" was not
limited to New York cases enforcing "imperfect" obligations. The court in
Schmidl v. Central Laundry & Supply Co. 78 used the language to help whittle
down an express covenant not to compete upon termination. A written contract
calling for Schmidl to solicit customers for Central Laundry contained a five-
year covenant not to compete, which included a promise not to "solicit or
canvas the trade or patronage of the customers" of Central Laundry. 79 Finding
that the contract was "instinct with the obligation . . .not to solicit the
customers, whom [Schmidl] had brought" to Central Laundry during Schmidl's
term of employment, the court nonetheless barred Schmidl from doing so for
only nine months.80 The court expressly acknowledged that its decision was
based on fairness and justice.8' Instinct reasoning had become a safety valve
not only to authorize courts to enforce intentions, but to achieve just results.
C. Proliferation
77 1d. The court ultimately found that the members of the Clearing House
committee had no power to bind their respective banks to insure the deposits of a
troubled member. Id. at 289. Perhaps the court got the best of both worlds. It could
chastise businessmen for not living up to their agreements, while avoiding a decision
that would have cost the banks several million dollars.
78 13 N.Y.S.2d 817 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
79 Id. at 820. The pertinent clause read in part:
It is further agreed that the second party will not, for a period of five (5)
years after the termination of this employment for any consideration whatsoever,
directly or indirectly, as employer, employee, or otherwise, engage in the linen
supply or laundry business of any rival or competing person, firm, or corporation
in the same or similar business within the boundaries of the County of Monroe,
State of New York, and the adjoining counties, and the second party will not, at
any tirmfe, solicit or canvas the trade or patronage of the customers of the first
party, or collect or deliver linen supplies or laundry to any of them for any other
person, firm or corporation, engaged in the linen supply or laundry business or
any similar business.
Id. The clause further provided that Central Laundry would be entitled to an
injunction to enforce the non-compete clause. Id.80 Id. at 824.
81 Id.
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By 1945 "instinct with an obligation" was firmly ensconced in the legal
lexicon of the New York bench. At about the same time, courts began to use
the language extensively outside of New York in contract and other cases. In
part, this was the result of the importance and influence of New York law. In
addition, the appeal of Wood v. Lucy reached outside of New York.
Many of the contract-law cases reflected the approach Cardozo had in mind
when he adopted the instinct language in Wood v. Lucy: focusing on the context
to determine the parties' intentions about an incomplete contract. For example,
in Kane v. Chrysler Corp.,82 the Kane's dealership contract with Dodge did not
expressly require the Kanes to buy any automobiles for resale or expressly
require Dodge to sell any cars.83 The Delaware district court noted that the
contract provided for an exclusive dealership,8 4 required the dealer to maintain
a suitable place of business, obligated the dealer to maintain a supply of spare
parts, and contained "meticulous provisions for the termination of the
agreement" that would be difficult to explain if "the parties knew [the contract]
did not exist and had no binding force." 85 In finding that the parties intended to
contract, the court drew upon Wood v. Lucy:
Clearly the parties intended to enter into some agreement for the sale and
purchase of automobiles and parts.... Merely because the exact obligation of
the parties is not clearly stated is no reason to fail to see the obligation inherent
in almost every line of the contract itself. In language approved by Justice
Cardozo in Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, ... "A promise may be
lacking, and yet the whole writing may be 'instinct with an obligation,'
imperfectly expressed." 86
Although Kane's focus on avenues of avoiding the mutuality doctrine
resembled many of the early New York cases invoking "instinct with an
obligation," other cases both inside and outside of New York continued to
expand the language's domain. For example, courts utilized the aphorism to
diminish onerous express terms. In Rein v. Robert Metrik Co., 87 a two-and-
one-half year written lease of an apartment under construction commenced on
82 80 F. Supp. 360 (1. Del. 1948).
83 Id. at 362-63.
84 Most courts applied the mutuality limitation if the agreement did not call for
exclusive dealings. See, e.g., Zeyher v. S.S. & S. Mfg. Comp., 319 F.2d 606 (7th
Cir. 1963).
85 Kane, 80 F. Supp. at 362-63.
86 Id. (citation omitted).
87 105 N.Y.S.2d 160 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
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October 1, a or near the time of the tenant's marriage.88 Nevertheless, the
lease contained a term expressly exculpating the landlord for delay and
providing that the lease would still be valid.89 The landlord had orally assured
the tenant that the apartment would be ready on time, but some six months
beyond the promised date construction still was not completed. 90 Based more
on fairness than on the parties' actual intentions, the New York court ruled that
the lease was "instinct with an obligation" on the landlord's part to make the
demised premises available within a reasonable time, unless "factors beyond
[the] control" of the landlord made that impossible.91 The court granted the
tenant rescission because the landlord had not provided proof of "diligence" in
attempting to complete the building on time.92
Recently, Judge (now Justice) Scalia saw the compatibility of instinct
reasoning and the burgeoning doctrine of good faith performance in his
decision to ameliorate the harshness of an express term. In lymshare, Inc. v.
Covell,93 a written employment contract allowed Covell, a sales representative,
commissions on sales above a particular quota. 94 However, the contract also
expressly authorized Tymshare to raise the sales quota retroactively without
notice and reason, which would decrease Covell's compensation. 95 Covell
claimed Tymshare exercised the power in bad faith to deprive him of earned
compensation. 96
88 Id. at 161.
89 The provision stated "[i]f Landlord shall be unable to give possession of the
demised premises on the date of the commencement of the term... Landlord shall
not be subject to any liability for the failure to give possession on said date .... [A]nd
no such failure to give possession on the date of commencement of the term shall in




92 Id.; see also Schisgall v. Fairchild Publications, Inc., 137 N.Y.S.2d 312 (Sup.
Ct. 1955). In Schisgall the court found that a publisher could be liable in tort for
failing to promote a book it had agreed to publish even though the contract permitted
the publisher to discontinue publication if it believed there was no public demand for
the work. Id. at 317-18. After quoting the "instinct" aphorism in Wood v. Lucy, the
court found a "special relationship between author and publisher that "may not be
specifically expressed, and yet the whole factual situation may be instinct with a duty
which should be imposed by law upon the publisher." Id. at 318.
93 727 F.2d 1145 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
9 4 Id. at 1148.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 1148-49.
1995]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
Under the doctrine of good faith performance, courts bar conduct that
contradicts the reasonable expectations of the parties. 97 Courts have recognized
that even a provision purporting to grant sole power to a party does not
necessarily authorize the party to exercise the power "for any reason
whatsoever, no matter how arbitrary or unreasonable." 98 Such an interpretation
would probably conflict with the other party's reasonable expectations because
it would deny that party the fruits of the contract.
Judge Scalia therefore sought to determine whether Tymshare's retroactive
alteration of Covell's sales quota and compensation contradicted Covell's
reasonable expectations, despite the express clause expressly permitting such
conduct. Judge Scalia stated:
[A]greeing to such a provision would require a degree of folly on the part
of these sales representatives we are not inclined to posit where another
plausible interpretation of the language is available. It seems to us that the
"sole discretion" intended was discretion to determine the existence or
nonexistence of the various factors that would reasonably justify alteration of
the sales quota. Those factors would include... an unanticipated volume of
business from a particular customer unconnected with the extra sales efforts of
the employee assigned to that account; and.., a poor overall sales year for the
company, leaving less gross income to be expended on commissions.... But
the language need not (and therefore can not reasonably) be read to confer
discretion to [increase] the quota for any reason whatever-including... a
simple desire to deprive an employee of the fairly agreed benefit of his
labors.9 9
In short, Judge Scalia reasoned that the parties probably did not intend to
permit the employer to reduce the employee's compensation retroactively and
arbitrarily because a reasonable employee would not agree to such an onerous
provision.' 00 Reasonable parties, in other words, intend to incorporate terms
that society would find fair and just. Judge Scalia saw the compatibility of this
reasoning and the logic of the instinct cases. He remarked that his approach
97 Id. at 1152.
98 Id. at 1154; see also Nolan v. Control Data Corp., 579 A.2d 1252, 1259 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990).
99 Tymshare, 727 F.2d at 1154. The reasoning is similar when the issue is a
bank's right to set NSF fees: "[D]iscretion had to be exercised within the confines of
the reasonable expectations of the depositors." Best v. U.S. Nat'l Bank of Oregon,
739 P.2d 554, 558 (Or. 1987).
100 Tymrshare 727 F.2d at 1154.
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"perform[ed] the same function executed (with more elegance and precision) by
Judge Cardozo in Wood v. Lucy," where Cardozo "found that an agreement
which did not recite a particular duty was nonetheless '"instinct with... an
obligation"' ..... -10 Put another way, instinct reasoning supplies the terms a
party acting in good faith must follow. 102
Relying in part on the instinct language, courts also began to infer
obligations based primarily on the relationship between the parties. For
example, in Onderdonk v. Presbyterian Homes of New Jersey,10 3 the court
determined that a "special relationship" existed between the management and
the residents of a life-care community.104 The court found an implied covenant
to release financial information to residents concerning administration of the
community:
Where fairness and justice require, even though the parties to a contract have
not expressed an intention in specific language, the courts may impose a
constructive condition to accomplish such a result when it is apparent that it is
necessarily involved in the contractual relationship. In Wood v. Lucy, Lady
Duff-Gordon, Justice (then Judge Cardozo said): "A promise may be lacking,
and yet the whole writing may be 'instinct with an obligation,' imperfectly
expressed."' 05
The court did not explain when a term was "necessarily involved in the
contractual relationship." Instead, it frankly revealed its goal in finding an
implied obligation: to reassure elderly residents of the financial soundness of
101 Id. at 1152 (quoting Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214, 214
(1917) (quoting from McCall v. Wright, 117 N.Y.S. 775, 779 (App. Div. 1909),
aft'd, 91 N.E. 516 (N.Y. 1910))).
102 For some recent additional cases, see Seal v. Riverside Federal Say. Bank,
825 F. Supp. 686 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Don King Productions, Inc. v. Douglas, 742 F.
Supp. 741 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), adhered to on reh'g, 742 F. Supp. 786 (S.D.N.Y. 1990);
United States v. Castelbuono, 643 F. Supp. 965 (E.D.N.Y. 1986); Lee v. Joseph E.
Seagram & Sons, Inc., 413 F. Supp 693 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 552 F.2d 447 (2d
Cir. 1977); Radio Picture Show Partnership v. Exclusive Int'l Pictures, Inc., 482
N.E.2d 1159 (Ind. App. 1985); Fashion Fabrics of Iowa, Inc. v. Retail Investors
Corp., 266 N.W.2d 22 (Iowa 1978); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 483 N.E.2d 838
(Mass. App. Ct. 1985); Shapiro v. Dictaphone Corp., 411 N.Y.S.2d 669 (App. Div.
1978).
103 425 A.2d 1057 (N.J. 1981).
I04 Id. at 1065-66.
105 Id. at 1063 (citations omitted) (quoting from Palisades Properties, Inc. v.
Brunetti, 207 A.2d 522, 531 (N.J. 1965)).
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their community. 106
In Ciufo v. Ciufo,107 the court found that a marriage was "instinct with an
obligation" on the part of each spouse to share his or her wealth with the other.
The court therefore held that Mrs. Ciufo held half of the proceeds and real
property of her business in constructive trust for her husband, despite evidence
that Mr. Ciufo had been physically violent and a poor coworker.' 08 Society no
longer views a woman's role in a marriage as subordinate and no longer
tolerates marital abuse. It is therefore unlikely that a court today would find the
Ciufo marriage "instinct with an obligation" to share wealth. This suggests the
importance of nonconsensual values in "instinct" cases. 109 It remained for the
Michigan Supreme Court in 1980 to carry this logic to the important
employment relationship.
D. "Instinct with an Obligation" and the Modem Employment
Relationship
The employment-at-will rule, dominant for at least the last century, 110
106 Id. at 1066.
107 60 N.Y.S.2d 848 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
108 Id. at 859-61 (citations omitted). Another New York court used the "instinct
with obligation" language to imply a constructive trust to benefit a divorced wife.
Scull v. Scull, 462 N.Y.S.2d 890, 895 (App. Div. 1983), aft'd, 493 N.E.2d 238 (N.Y.
1986).
109 See also United States v. Castelbuono, 643 F. Supp. 965 (E.D.N.Y. 1986).
The Castelbuono court ruled that an agreement granting immunity to a criminal
defendant in return for assisting prosecutors and investigators in a major money
laundering case was "instinct with an obligation . . . to use reasonable efforts in
supplying information to and cooperating with the Government." Id. at 970. The
defendant was a Harvard Law graduate who masterminded a money laundering
scheme. Id. at 967. The court admonished the defendant for failing to learn the lesson
of Wood v. Lucy in his first-year contracts class. Id at 970.
110 For an excellent treatment of the employment-at-will rule, see Jay M.
Feinman, The Development of the Employment At Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
118 (1976). Over 100 years ago, Horace Gray Wood wrote:
With us the rule is inflexible, that a general or indefinite hiring is primafacie
a hiring at-will, and if the servant seeks to make it out a yearly hiring, the burden
is upon him to establish it by proof. . . . [I]t is an indefinite hiring and is
determinable at the will of either party ....
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holds that "[c]ontracts for permanent employment . . . in the absence of
distinguishing features or provisions or... consideration in addition to the
services rendered . . . are indefinite hirings, terminable at the will of either
party."' Under the rule, in the absence of an express term of employment, an
employer can terminate an employee at any time for any reason.
By the 1980s the time was ripe for a change in the at-will employment rule
based on the perceived harshness of denying employees job security and the
leverage it afforded employers. 12 In Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of
Michigan,113 the Michigan Supreme Court accomplished the task, finding that
the employment relationship in certain circumstances was "instinct with an
obligation" of just-cause termination only. After Toussaint inquired about job
security, an officer of Blue Cross gave Toussaint a manual of personnel
policies and guidelines that set forth a company policy to: "treat employees
leaving Blue Cross in a fair and consistent manner and to release employees for
just cause only." 114 The company also told Toussaint that, if he performed
satisfactorily, the company would employ him until he retired.' 15 Nevertheless,
after hearing complaints and reviewing his performance, Blue Cross terminated
Toussaint. 116 Toussaint brought a wrongful termination action against Blue
Cross based both upon oral and written employment contracts. 117
The court found that a duty of just-cause termination could arise by virtue
of an oral or written express promise or based on the employee's "legitimate
expectations" arising from the employer's policy statements. 11 8 Further:
While an employer need not establish personnel policies or practices,
where an employer chooses to establish such policies and practices and makes
H. G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT § 134 (William S.
Hein & Co. 1981) (1877), quoted in Stephen F. Befort, Employee Handbooks and the
Legal Effect of'Disclaimers, 13 INDuS. REL. L.. 326, 329 (1991-92).
111 Lynas v. Maxwell Farms, 273 N.W. 315, 316 (Mich. 1937) (quoted in Dallas
Moon, Rowe v. Montgomery Ward & Co.: The Demise of Toussaint?, 1992 DaT.
C.L. REV. 711).
112 See, e.g., Deborah A. Schmedemann & Judi Mclean Parks, Contract
Formation and Employee Handbooks: Legal, Psychological, and Empirical Analyses,
29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 647, 652 n.38 (1994).
113 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 1980).
114 Id. at 893.
115 Id. at 884, 904.
116 1d. at 903.
117 Id.
118 Id. at 885.
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them known to its employees, the employment relationship is presumably
enhanced. The employer secures an orderly, cooperative and loyal workforce,
and the employee the peace of mind associated with job security and the
conviction that he will be treated fairly. No pre-employment negotiations need
take place and the parties' minds need not meet on the subject; nor does it
matter that the employee knows nothing of the particulars of the employer's
policies and practices or that the employer may change them unilaterally. It is
enough that the employer chooses, presumably in its own interest, to create an
environment in which the employee believes that, whatever the personnel
policies and practices, they are established and official at any given time,
purport to be fair, and are applied consistently and uniformly to each
employee. The employer has then created a situation "instinct with an
obligation." 1 19
This passage clarifies what was only intimated in many of the earlier
instinct cases. An agreement could be "instinct with an obligation" based not
on the parties intentions at all, but on principles and policies arising from the
relationship of the parties and their course of conduct. 120 In the employment
realm, these principles and policies included the establishment of fair
employment practices and greater job security for employees when an employer
creates a general environment suggesting as much. 121
As with Wood v. Lucy before it, Toussaint instigated an explosion of
litigation, both in Michigan and elsewhere, with most cases specifically relying
on the instinct passage. Cases confirmed that an employee need not have had
actual knowledge of nor have relied on the "just cause" policy statement. 122 In
addition, a duty of just-cause employment could arise out of the introduction of
119 Id. at 892 (footnote omitted).
120 Id. at 890.
121 See, e.g., Linzer, supra note 52, at 350 (public policy similar to the duty to
rescue once a rescue has begun); David Dominguez, Just Cause Protection: Will the
Demise of Employment At Will Breathe New Life Into Collective Job Security?, 28
IDAHoL. REv. 283, 290 (1991-92).
122 Smith v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 794 F. Supp. 1035, 1041 (D. Colo.
1992); Kinoshita v. Canadian Pac. Airlines, Ltd., 724 P.2d 110, 117 (Haw. 1986);
Woohey v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1268 n.10 (N.J. 1985), judgment
modified, 499 A.2d 515 (N.J. 1985). Moreover, courts could bind employers even
when employees began work prior to the adoption of an employment manual. Pelizza
v. Reader's Digest Sales & Services Inc., 624 F. Supp. 806, 810 (N.D. Il. 1985);
Damrow v. Thumb Cooperative Terminal, Inc., 337 N.W.2d 338, 342-43 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1983).
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written procedures for termination 123 or an employer's previous approach to
unsatisfactory performance, such as the creation of a probationary status. 124 In
fact, some courts ignored statements in manuals disclaiming any legal
obligation or reserving the right to terminate without cause when other
provisions contradicted the statements and were "instinct with an obligation" of
just-cause employment. 125
123 Pelizza, 624 F.Supp. at 810.
124 Brewster v. Martin Marietta Aluminum Sales, Inc., 378 N.W.2d 558, 565
(Mich. Ct. App. 1985). In Brewster, Martin Marietta had terminated Brewster for
poor performance and insubordination. Id. at 559. Based on a supervisor's testimony
that the plaintiff's work had been unsatisfactory, the court stated:
[Ilt appears to us that the probationary period in which the plaintiff was given
an opportunity to change or correct her job performance and alleged
insubordination and the wording of [the supervisor's] letter, among other things
such as the memoranda to plaintiff of the excellent work she had done prior to the
period of probation, shows that the defendant had established a policy pertaining
to her by conduct and words to terminate only for just cause upon which she
could rely.
Id. at 565; see also Johnson v. Nasca, 802 P.2d 1294, 1297 & n.2 (Okla. Ct. App.
1990) (reasonable expectation based on a pattern of practice in the work place).
125 In Jones v. Central Peninsula Gen. Hosp., 779 P.2d 783, 787 (Alaska 1989),
for example, the manual disclaimed any legal obligation: "The purpose of this manual
is to provide information to all ... employees. It is not a contract of employment nor
is it incorporated in any contract of employment." Id. at 787. (noting that a one-
sentence disclaimer was followed by eighty-five pages of detailed text, the court stated
that the manual "does not unambiguously and conspicuously inform the employee that
the manual is not part of the employee's contract of employment." Id. at 788. In
Angotti v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 91-1048, 1991 WL 244962, at *4 (6th
Cir. Nov. 22, 1991) (per curiam), one provision of an employment handbook stated
that "continued employment is contingent upon, among other things, [the employee's]
demonstration of... ability to meet prospecting and production requirements."
Another term provided that "either [the employee] or the Company may terminate this
Agreement by written notice." Id. Relying in part on the "instinct with an obligation"
aphorism, the court held that the handbook taken as a whole established a just-cause
employment relationship. Id. Otherwise, the provision making employment contingent
upon production requirements would be meaningless.
A survey between 1980 and 1991 revealed forty-one cases that failed to give
dispositive weight to disclaimers contained either in a handbook or job application.
Stephen F. Befort, Employee Handbooks and the Legal Effect of Disclainers, 13
INDUS. REL. L.J. 326, 382 (1991-92).
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Of course, not all courts utilized the instinct language in finding for an
employee, 126 and some upheld the termination-at-will rule. 127 However, even
in the latter cases, no court repudiated the instinct reasoning. Instead, courts
simply found that particular employment relationships were not "instinct with
an obligation" of just-cause employment. For example, some courts failed to
find an implied promise of just-cause employment in employment manuals that
lacked specificity 128 or contained clear disclaimers. 129 In addition, courts
balked at finding for employees whose expectations were based on a
"manager's guide" not rightfully in their possession 130 or on general statements
of the employee's "bright future" with the company 31 or simply on the kind of
employment. 132 Unlike Toussaint, these cases were not always clear on
whether an employee had to have actual knowledge of the statement or conduct
that created expectations of just-cause employment. At any rate, the difficult
line-drawing necessary to distinguish these situations from those "instinct with
an obligation" of just-cause employment began to undermine the approach.
In fact, in its most recent account of Toussaint, the Michigan Supreme
Court expressed its concern with the message some courts had derived. In
Rowe v. Montgomery Ward & CO.,133 a representative of Montgomery Ward
126 See, e.g., Metcalf v. Intermountain Gas Co., 778 P.2d 744, 752-53 (Idaho
1989) (decision based on the obligation of good faith and fair dealing).
127 See cases cited infra notes 128-32.
128 Stewart v. Chevron Chem. Co., 762 P.2d 1143, 1145 (Wash. 1988)
(employment manual used unspecific terms such as "should"); see also Staggs v. Blue
Cross of Maryland, 486 A.2d 798, 809 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985) (general statements
made in a personnel handbook or other publications do not rise to the level of an
enforceable covenant), cert. denied, 493 A.2d 349 (Md. 1985).
129 See, e.g., Cox v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 751 F. Supp. 680, 688-90
(E.D. Mich. 1990) (employment agreement clearly stated that employment was at-
will); Fussell v. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of Am., No. 90-1774, 1991 U.S.
App. LEXIS 8970, at *13 (6th Cir. Apr. 30, 1991) (per curiam) (disclaimer on first
and last page of manual was effective).
130 Triplett v. Electronic Data Sys. (EDS), 710 F. Supp. 667, 673 (W.D. Mich.
1989), aftd, 900 F.2d 260 (6th Cir. 1990).
131 Transou v. Electronic Data Sys., 767 F. Supp. 1392, 1397 (E.D. Mich.
1991), aft'd, 986 F.2d 1422 (6th Cir. 1993).
132 Gertler v. Goodgold, 487 N.Y.S.2d 565, 569 (App. Div. 1985) (professor
unsuccessfully argued that tenure was "instinct with an obligation" to provide faculty
members with adequate research facilities), aff'd, 489 N.E.2d 748 (N.Y. 1985).
133 473 N.W.2d 268 (Mich. 1991).
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told Rowe she would not be terminated as long as she met her sales quota.134
Referring to Toussaint, the court stated:
[Ihis Court joined the forefront of a nationwide experiment in which,
under varying theories, courts extended job security to nonunionized
employees. . . . However the theory remains troubling because of those
instances in which application of contract law is a transparent invitation to the
factfinder to decide not what the "contract" was, but what "fairness"
requnies. 13
5
Preferring this time to narrow its decision to the issue of mutual assent, the
court focused on the parties' language and found the representative's statements
insufficient to support Rowe's contention of an implied-in-fact promise limiting
Montgomery Ward's right to terminate her employment. 136 Moreover, the
court remarked that "oral statements of job security must be clear and
unequivocal to overcome the presumption of employment at will." 137 The court
also found that the disclaimer contained in the employee manual clearly and
unambiguously contemplated at-will employment.' 38
In light of Rowe, the future of just-cause employment remains unclear.
Nevertheless, at present it is fair to say that courts have utilized instinct
reasoning to increase employee protection, thereby affecting a significant
change in employment law in the United States. Where courts previously
required clear evidence of the parties' intention to rebut the presumption of at-
will employment, Toussaint and its progeny substituted the test of whether an
employer had created a situation "instinct with an obligation" of just-cause
employment. The requirement of mutual assent to the terms of a contractual
obligation was no longer essential.
134 Id. at 270.
135 Id. at 269. For a discussion of the Rowe decision and its implications, see
Dallas Moon, Rowe v. Montgomery Ward & Co.: The Demise of Toussaint?, 1992
DET. C.L. REV. 711 (Rowe was a refinement and not an overruling of the theories in
Toussaint).
136 Rowe, 473 N.W.2d at 274.
137 Id. at 275.
138 Id. at 277; see also Carlson v. Hutzel Corp. of Michigan, 455 N.W.2d 335,
338-39 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990) (employer can unilaterally alter a written policy with
regard to arbitration); In re Certified Question, 443 N.W.2d 112 (Mich. 1989),
confomed to in Bankey v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 882 F.2d 208 (6th Cir. 1989);
Kalifa v. Henry Ford Hosp., 401 N.W.2d 884, 890 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (employees
covered by a collective bargaining agreement cannot avail themselves of the policy-
manual reasoning of Toussaint).
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III. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF "INSTINCT WITH AN OBLIGATION"
A study of instinct reasoning offers important insights concerning the
nature of modem contract law. The analysis also helps formulate a response to
Judge Posner's implicit question about the value of judicial rhetoric.
A. The Nature of Modern Contract Law
1. Contract Law's Pluralism
Contract theorists have spilled considerable ink analyzing the relationship
of principles supporting the exercise of private preferences and principles
legitimizing judicial intervention in the contracting process, ranging from
fairness, equality, and morality to efficiency. 139 The story of instinct reasoning
does not hold out any new or dramatic insight into this relationship. Instead, it
reaffirms and substantiates a view of the importance of both consensual and
interventionist principles in contract law in a continuously evolving framework,
reflecting the social, economic, and political forces of a pluralist society.
We saw that courts conceived instinct reasoning to facilitate new methods
of doing business during the prominence of laissez faire economics and
freedom of contract and the decline of legal formalism. 140 It was not surprising
during this period for courts to override burdensome contract doctrine that
interfered with the parties' presumed intentions as gleaned from the
circumstances or, put another way, to "track lay understanding rather than
force lay persons to conform their transactions to rigid legal
categories .... "-141 For example, Cardozo sought to show in Moran v.
Standard Oil Co. and Wood v. Lucy that his decisions reinforced the parties'
139 For example, Charles Fried posited that the promises of contracting parties
dominate contract law. CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF
CONTRACTuAL OBLIGATION 1-27 (1981). In contrast, Grant Gilmore insisted that court-
supplied, non-consensual principles "swallowed up" private contract law. GILMORE,
supra note 7, at 55-85. Critical theorists refer to the problem as the "fundamental
contradiction" between freedom of the individual and the need for relations with
others. See Jay M. Feinman, Critical Approaches to Contract Law, 30 UCLA L. REV.
829, 844-47 (1992-93).
140 See supra notes 13-22 and accompanying text.
141 POSNER, supra note 8, at 93.
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actual intentions, which they simply expressed "imperfectly." 142 Even at the
outset, however, courts did not ignore interventionist principles. Recall that in
Moran, for example, Cardozo frowned on the "one-sidedness" of an
arrangement that would have permitted Standard Oil to terminate at will.' 43
Cardozo sought to ensure that each party enjoyed the fruits of the exchange
according to their presumed purposes in contracting. In addition, although not
expressly stated, Cardozo seemed to want to enforce Lucy's promise of an
exclusive agency in Wood v. Lucy at least in part because of the moral principle
that people should keep their promises. 144
As time progressed, the free-market approach declined, and legislatures
responded to the "perceived excesses" of the market by creating the twentieth-
century welfare state.145 At least in emphasis, instinct cases reflected this shift.
Courts began more outwardly and directly to use the instinct reasoning to
support decisions based on fairness or other policies. For example, in
O'Connor, the court found vague promises to be "instinct with an obligation"
in order to avoid panic and a run on New York banks during the depression. 146
In Toussaint, the court took great pains to establish a nonconsensual right of
just-cause employment to confer on employees greater rights in the
workplace. 147
Although interventionist principles may have increased in importance or
142 See supra notes 34-52 and accompanying text.
143 See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
144 See also Daniel A. Farber & John H. Matheson, Beyond Promissory Estoppel:
Contract Law and the "Invisible Handshake", 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 903, 921 nn.76-77
0985) (promise enforceable in cases such as Wood v. Lucy when promisor to receive a
"tangible economic benefit"); Note, Benjamin N. Cardozo: A Directive Force in Legal
Science, 69 B.U. L. Rnv. 213, 225 (1989) (Wood v. Lucy "promoted the ethics in
honoring one's commitments in commercial settings"). See generally FRIED, supra
note 139.
145 Richard E. Speidel, An Essay on the Reported Death and Continued Vitality of
Contract, 27 STAN. L. RPv. 1161, 1175-76 (1975); see also P. S. ATIYAH, THE RISE
AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CoNTRACT 716-18 (1979). The rise of the welfare state in
America began with factory laws and worker's compensation laws designed to
"safeguard the individual against the uncertain nature" of industrialized society.
BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE HISTORY OF THE LAW IN AMERICA 204
(1974); see also KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION 149-50 0944)
(countermove against economic liberalism and laissez-faire was a "spontaneous
reaction" to protect against destruction of the social order).
146 See supra notes 71-77 and accompanying text.
147 See supra notes 113-21 and accompanying text.
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even gained the upper hand during this period, few courts completely ignored
consensual principles. Often courts focused on interventionist principles to
determine what the parties reasonably or fairly must have intended. For
example, recall that in Tymshare, Judge Scalia preserved Covell's earned sales
commissions despite Tymshare's express right to cancel them retroactively, at
least in part because he believed that parties acting fairly and reasonably would
not have agreed to permit the employer to withdraw earned commissions just to
increase its own gains. 148 Even in Toussaint, the court offered an alternative
assent-based ground for protecting Toussaint. 149
Individualism has resurfaced in the late twentieth century in the form of the
deregulation movement, in part the result of a general disillusionment with
social programs.150 It is no surprise in this environment that courts have begun
to restrict the domain of instinct reasoning. For example, we saw that the
Michigan Supreme Court in Rowe narrowed its focus to determine whether
Montgomery Ward had clearly and unequivocally promised just-cause
employment.1 51 All in all, the experience of instinct reasoning supports Grant
Gilmore's observation of an orderly evolution of contract law consisting of
"alternating rhythms" of classicism, symbolized by order and logic, and
romanticism, characterized by experimentation and improvisation. 152 Further,
these periods, according to Gilmore, are brought on by psychological, social,
and economic forces reacting to the dominant legal regime. 153
2. The Triumph of Standards in Contract Law
Instinct reasoning is one of several legal safety valves that authorizes
judges to appraise the circumstances and equities of a case, to expand legal
texts, and to avoid mechanical application of or manipulation and obfuscation
of rules.154 Such legal mechanisms, which help ensure the continuity of the
148 See supra notes 93-102 and accompanying text.
149 See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
150 Thomas W. Merrill, Public Contracts, Private Contracts, and the
Transfornation of the Constitutional Order, 37 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 597, 627-28
(1987).
151 See supra notes 133-38 and accompanying text.
152 GILMORE, supra note 7, at 103.
153 Id.
154 See generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: 77Te Justices of Rules and
Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 66 (1992). Recently Professor Kaplow
characterized rules as consisting of "an advance determination of what conduct is
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rule of law because they "'enable the content of legal norms to change while
ensuring that the legal order continues as an unbroken unity,'" 155 are, of
course, not limited to contract law. For example, the Supreme Court has
expanded express Bill of Rights guarantees through "penumbras," formed by
emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance. 156
Within contract law, we have already seen the close relationship between
instinct reasoning and the legal standard of good faith performance. 157 Instinct
reasoning also shares many attributes with the doctrine of unconscionability.
Both require a deep contextual analysis of the process by which contracts are
formed and an examination of the purpose and effect of the resulting terms.
Together they furnish courts with an impressive arsenal for either finding or
striking an obligation.
Some theorists contend that contract standards such as unconscionability
and good faith decrease the law's predictability and increase the costs of
contract planning and adjudication of disputes because they enlarge the factors
judges can employ in deciding cases. 158 Indeed, they argue that standards tempt
permissible, leaving only factual issues for the adjudicator." Louis Kaplow, Rules
Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J 557, 560 (1992). Rules
therefore confine the decisionmaker to a range of preestablished elements. Id. at 589;
see also Duncan Kennedy, Legal Fonnality, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 351, 355 (1973).
Standards, on the other hand, "entail leaving both specification of what conduct is
permissible and factual issues for the adjudicator." Kaplow, supra, at 560; see also
Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARv. L.
REV. 1685, 1688 (1976) [hereinafter Kennedy, Form and Substance] ("The application
of a standard requires the judge both to discover the facts of a particular situation and
to assess them in terms of the purposes or social values embodied in the standard.").
Of course, much of law falls somewhere between these poles. A rule can be very
general, for instance, and a standard quite specific. Professor Kennedy notes that "[a]
rule setting the age of legal majority at 21 is more general than a rule setting the age
of capacity to contract at 21." Id. at 1689. Moreover, "[a] standard of reasonable care
in the use of firearms is more particular than a standard of reasonable care in the use
of 'any dangerous instrumentality.'" Id. Of course, rules and standards tend to
conflate in actual operation, and the definitions here omit many of their attributes.
155 M. P. Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 YALE L.J. 757, 760
(1969) (quoting JULIUS STONE, LEGAL SYSTEM AND LAWYERS' REASONING 25 (1964)).
156 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). Professor Charny equates
instinct reasoning and penumbras. See Charny, supra note 52, at 1828-30 & n.44.
157 See supra notes 93-102 and accompanying-text.
158 Although the costs of promulgating a detailed and comprehensive rule may be
higher than adopting a more general standard, neo-formalists believe that the savings
realized by applying the rule more than make up for these potential greater costs.
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judges to decrease their "analytical rigor" 159 or, worse, to usurp power more
appropriately residing in the legislature 160 or in the parties themselves.
Moreover, these theorists have little faith that courts can and will successfully
develop specific criteria to fill out the meaning of these standards in various
contexts.
Parties undoubtedly incur costs attempting to predict the factors a court
may take into account in determining whether a relation is "instinct with an
obligation." Moreover, at least some courts seem to have engaged in broad,
perhaps inaccurate generalizing about the responsibility of various social actors
(e.g., spouses must always share their wealth) and about the need for particular
contract clauses (e.g., employers do not need terminable-at-will employment
contracts). 161 In fact, in their effort to reach a fair result, a few courts seem to
have felt little need at all to engage in deep analysis of the issue at hand.162
Ironically, such judicial activity undoubtedly has resulted in some unfair
decisions.
My strong impression, however, is that the benefits of instinct reasoning
outweigh its costs. For one thing, the rise of instinct reasoning avoided the
costs of promulgating and administering specific rules to accommodate the new
social and economic realities. This benefit probably outweighs the cost of
applying instinct reasoning. For the most part, courts have also utilized instinct
reasoning competently and coherently by establishing a framework for
implementing consensual and interventionist principles in particular contexts,
Kaplow, supra note 154, at 621.
159 Even Ellinghaus, a strong supporter of unconscionability, makes the point.
Ellinghaus, supra note 155, at 761.
160 See Kennedy, Form and Substance, supra note 154, at 1752-53 (describing
the argument).
161 Courts can also compare the conduct of similarly situated commercial parties
to determine whether particular behavior fits a community standard. This approach to
fairness questions, however, presents many opportunities for error in evaluating
individual behavior and assessing the community's mores. Some believe that there is
"no way to make a distributional judgment fairly." Alan Schwartz, Comments on
Professor Harrison's Paper, 1988 ANN. SURv. AM. L. 115, 120. Moreover, it ensures
adherence to the "predominant morals of the marketplace," and precludes serious
consideration of more desirable alternatives. Richard Danzig, A Comment on the
Jurisprudence of the Unifonn Commercial Code, 27 STAN. L. RIv. 621, 629-30
(1975).
162 Standards may "allow courts to act as roving commissions to set aside those
agreements whose substantive terms they find objectionable." Richard A. Epstein,
Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. & ECON. 293, 294 1975).
[Vol. 56:775
INSTINCT WITH AN OBLIGATION
thereby conferring meaning on the language and limiting judicial discretion. 163
Structurally, instinct reasoning resembles the judicial approach to
unconscionability. Although unconscionability has itself been the subject of
severe criticism on the grounds of its vacuousness, 164 courts have helpfully
isolated criteria and established precedent for applying the standard. The
paradigm case for finding unconscionability involves both "bargaining
naughtiness," diminishing the quality of a party's assent (also called
"procedural unconscionability"), and grossly unfair terms (known as
"substantive unconscionability").165
The bargaining process may be tainted with procedural unconscionability
when a party unduly influences her counterpart 166 or misrepresents the facts. 167
Procedural unconscionability also encompasses sneaky drafting techniques such
as burying controversial terms in fine print, creating a "linguistic maze" of
contradictory provisions, 168 or drafting incomprehensible terms. 169
163 See infra part I.A.3. "[L]egal doctrines... represent . . . time-tested
approaches for determining what facts are relevant, why they are relevant, [and] the
degree of strength of the relevance." Walter E. Oberer, On Law, Lawyering and Law
Professing: The Golden Sand, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 203, 205 (1989).
164 The leading article is Arthur Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The
Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1967).
165 Id. at 488, 539-40.
166 For example, a sophisticated seller may knowingly induce an uneducated
buyer to make a purchase beyond the buyer's means. See, e.g., Frostifresh Corp. v.
Reynoso, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757, 758 (Dist. Ct. 1966) (contract unconscionable in part
because of salesman's awareness of buyer's imminent termination of employment),
rev'd on other grounds, 281 N.Y.S.2d 964 (App. Term 1967); see also Ellinghaus,
supra note 155, at 771. Undue influence occurs when a party engages in conduct that
overpowers the will of another and induces him to do something that he would not
have done otherwise. See, e.g., Waters v. Min Ltd., 587 N.E.2d 231, 234 (Mass.
1992).
167 See, e.g., Davis v. Kolb, 563 S.W.2d 438, 438 (Ark. 1978).
168 Gladden v. Cadillac Motor Car Div., 416 A.2d 394, 401 (N.J. 1980). The
court, applying contract interpretation principles to a tire manufacturer's guarantee,
concluded that a contract term limiting the buyer's remedy was unenforceable because
the guarantee presented the tire owner with a "linguistic maze" of contradictory
provisions. Id. 1he court indicated that the conflicting terms of the guarantee had
induced the purchaser into believing "that he was obtaining a guarantee of
performance." The court called the contract "a mdlange of overlapping, variant,
misleading, and contradictory provisions." Id. A concurring judge would have held
that the remedy limitation was unconscionable. Id. at 404 (Pashman, J., concurring).
169 For example, courts utilize the doctrine to evaluate the quality of consumer
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The subject of substantive unconscionability is egregious terms. Some
terms are substantively unconscionable because they are immoral or contravene
public policy. Even short of such obvious constraints, a term may be
substantively unconscionable if it denies a party substantially what she
bargained for and performs no reasonable function in the trade. 170 Courts also
consider whether a term serves the legitimate needs of a party or simply
provides an unfair advantage. 171 Although the best case for finding
unconscionability involves both procedural and substantive unconscionability,
some courts have struck terms considered unfair without evidence of lack of
assent. Still, such decisions are not revolutionary departures from the assent
principle because courts usually reason that the gross imbalance in terms proves
that something must have been wrong with the formation process. 172
As with unconscionability, instinct reasoning authorizes courts to weigh the
formation process and the nature of terms, not generally to annul an obligation,
however, but to find, create, or define one. Courts proceed in this fashion
when the bargaining process is not only devoid of assent-compromising
conduct such as coercion, misrepresentation, or sneaky conduct, but when the
context affirmatively suggests the parties assented to a particular obligation. As
we saw, courts find such "super-assent" based primarily on a contextual
investigation of the purposes of a contract, believing that the parties must have
agreed to terms designed to further each party's goals. 173 In addition, the terms
implied must not only avoid problems of imbalance, but also be "super-
conscionable" in the sense that they guarantee each party the fruits of the
exchange. These areas of inquiry are obviously interrelated, and it is no
surprise that most cases employing instinct reasoning involve an analysis both
of assent and the fairness of the contract, albeit with the emphasis changing
depending on the context and the societal influences of the time. 174
assent when consumers who lack information and sophistication are confronted by
industry-wide, one-sided form contracts. Robert A. Hillman, Debunking Some Myths
About Unconscionability: A New Framework for U. C.C. Section 2-302, 67 CORNELL
L. REv. 1, 25-26 (1981).
170 Id. at 32-33.
171 Id. at 33-34.
172 See, e.g., Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 298 N.Y.S.2d 264, 267 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
173 See; e.g., supra notes 93-102 and accompanying text. Courts also consider
the labels the parties attach to their writings, the express duties assigned under the
contract, and the relationship of the parties. See supra notes 40-49, 103-09 and
accompanying text.
174 See supra notes 139-53 and accompanying text.
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3. The Relative Determinacy of Instinct Reasoning
Courts obviously enjoy some discretion in investigating "super-assent" and
"super-conscionability" in instinct cases. After all, the enterprise involves,
among other things, implying terms based on probable but not certain
intentions and on evaluating the fairness of an exchange. The absence of
definitive proof suggests that there will be many debatable cases. Nevertheless,
instinct language is not solely rhetorical and hollow. The method is not
indeterminate in the sense that courts can reach any result in any instinct case.
A court could not have found that the Tymshare employment contract was
"instinct with an obligation" on the part of Tymshare to give the company to
Covell or that the agreement in Wood v. Lucy was "instinct with an obligation"
on Lucy's part to extend the exclusive agency beyond the one-year term. Such
decisions would exceed the boundaries of assent and would be unfair and bad
policy. 175
This suggests that in some cases courts can harmonize the principles for
175 Such decisions would be unfair because they would deny one party the fruits
of the exchange and would take property from the party without compensation. The
decisions would be poor policy because, among other things, they would supply terms
the parties would not have wanted had they bargained over the matters, thereby
increasing the costs of contracting.
Some theorists see all of law as a branch of rhetoric, not as a "system of rules."
Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns, Editorial Introduction to THE RHETORIC OF LAw 8
(Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns, eds. 1994). One such theorist sees contract law as
an indeterminate "rhetorical structure," but applauds its nature: "It is because it is a
world made up of materials that pull in diverse directions that contract law can
succeed in its endless project of making itself into a formal whole." Stanley Fish, The
Law Wishes to Have a Formal Existence, in THE FATE OF LAW 159, 184 (Austin Sarat
& Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1991). Focusing on the consideration doctrine, Fish
remarks that "anticonsideration impulses can be harbored and even nurtured in
contract doctrine where, rather than undermining the orthodox view, they provide it
with the flexibility it needs." 1d. at 186-87. Consideration doctrine is therefore
"upheld by the rhetorical structure it has generated." Id. at 187.
Fish believes that law is legitimate not because it is a "determinate system of rules
and distinctions" but because it specifies "the vocabulary and conceptual
'neighborhood' of decision making." Id. at 195. Moreover, the law's failure to
acknowledge its indebtedness to "other discourses" is not unlike every other practice,
which proceeds in "ignorance of its debts and complicities." Id. at 204. Because of
this approach, the law can decide disputes and arrange for prompt remedies, which
enable us to live together in society.
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determining when a relation is "instinct with an obligation" 176 and can reach
decisions possessing "objective moral force." 177 Of course, the examples above
are "easy" cases. Nevertheless, courts could have decided few instinct cases
differently without raising eyebrows, at least after courts cleared the
psychological hurdle of abandoning the mutuality of obligation doctrine. This is
so precisely because of the close alignment of consensual and interventionist
principles in most of the instinct cases.178 Generally people who make
agreements seek not only to achieve their own goals but to cooperate and be
flexible so that the other party can also receive the fruits of the contract.
Contracting parties may be motivated by altruism or may hope to gain by
enhancing their reputation as a reliable contracting partner and by ensuring
future relations with their counterpart. 179 Regardless of the motivation, the
parties' intentions and interventionist principles such as fairness are likely to
point in the same direction.
176 See, e.g., WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT
255 (1973) ("[Most rules have 'a central core of habitually established content
surrounded by a penumbra of doubtful border-line cases.'") (quoting John Dickinson,
Legal Rules: Their Application and Elaboration, 79 U. PA. L. REv. 1052, 1085
(1931)); Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma,
54 U. CHI. L. REv. 462, 483 (1987) (noting that CLS "simply provides another
coherent explanation of why some legal rules are underdetermined over the set of all
cases").
177 See Allan C. Hutchinson & Patrick I. Monahan, Law, Politics, and the
Critical Legal Scholars: The Unfolding Drama of American Legal Thought, 36 STAN.
L. REv. 199, 208-09 (1984).
178 1 recognize that this assumes away the issues of the unfairness of preexisting
wealth patterns and how people form their preferences. These slippery questions
rarely surface in instinct cases, which, for the most part, involve parties of relatively
equal bargaining power. Even in Toussaint, the focus was not unfair bargaining
power, but the fairness of creating general expectations of security in order to secure
an efficient work force.
179 See Stewart Macaulay, Contract Law and Contract Research (Part 1I), 20 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 460, 463 (1968) (noting that business is not interested in contract law
because of the existence of cheaper private relational sanctions). See generally Robert
A. Hillman, Court Adjustment of Long-Term Contracts: An Analysis Under Modern
Contract Law, 1987 DUKE L.. 1, 4-6 (noting that such business realities may justify
inferring an agreement to modify a contract). "[F]Ilexibility is a marked trend in
marketing of goods ... wherever long-range buyer-seller relations come to seem
more important than exact definition of the risks to be shifted by the particular dicker
in terms of quantity, quality, or price." Karl N. Llewellyn, What Price Contract ?-An
Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704, 727 (1931).
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Of course there are exceptions. The experiment in Toussaint of establishing
a nonconsensual, policy-based employer obligation of just-cause employment is
the most obvious. In general, however, even courts bent on a policy analysis
have not strayed too far from the field of consensual exchange. In Toussaint,
the court limited the range of the new obligation to situations where an
employer "create[d] an environment" in which it was reasonable for employees
to believe they enjoyed job security. 180 As a result of this judicial culture of
taking the boundaries of consent in contracts cases seriously, if not literally,
instinct methodology permits a range of possible results, i.e., the approach is
sometimes "underdeterminate," but judges do not enjoy unbridled discretion.
In sum, the use of instinct reasoning obviously equips courts with an
arsenal of weapons. Judges can emphasize consensual or interventionist
principles in keeping with the social and economic environment, can adjust the
meaning of assent and fairness to fit the circumstances, and can decide "hard"
cases in conformity with one or another principle or a combination of
principles. 181 But that is precisely the appeal of the instinct aphorism. 182 Our
system of "private" exchange seems to work better than alternatives precisely
because it seeks to harmonize the value of private preferences and the need for
social control. Instinct reasoning encourages judges to appraise the entire set of
circumstances and equities of individual cases in context-dependent situations.
Against the backdrop of changing social and economic norms, instinct
reasoning thus encapsulates a useful, flexible, but not unprincipled approach to
deciding cases. 183 It is no surprise that Cardozo, who believed that the judicial
process consists of "logic, and history, and custom, and utility, and the
180 Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 292 N.W.2d 880, 892
(Mich. 1980). The supervisory manual in Toussaint stated: "Policy: It is the policy of
the company to treat employees leaving Blue Cross in a fair and consistent manner
and to release employees for just cause only." Id. at 903.
181 Cardozo stated that the legal process "in its highest reaches is not discovery,
but creation." BENJ ,MN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 166
(1921).
182 Such an approach acknowledges the "limits of judicial reasoning." Henly,
supra note 58, at 100, and therefore "[brings] law closer to the (informed) non-
lawyer's sense of justice." POSNER, supra note 8, at 127. When the circumstances are
"instinct with an obligation," "judicial interpretation is properly summoned to fill the
void or interstice." Heard v. Cuomo, 610 N.E.2d 348, 350 (N.Y. 1993).
183 See, e.g., Jefferson Powell, "Cardozo's Foot": The Chancellor's Conscience
and Constructive Trusts, 56 LAw & CoNTEMP. PRoBs. 7, 22 (1993) (Cardozo's use of
"instinct" means to interpret "sensibly and broadly").
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accepted standards of right conduct," 184 became enamored with instinct
reasoning.
B. The Role of Rhetoric in Contract Law
Part I concluded that instinct rhetoric appeals because it is unusual and
memorable, poetic and charming, and yet certain and distinct. Moreover, the
language reinforces a court's substantive findings by exuding confidence and
forcefulness. Although some courts use the language as a "crutchI on which
[they] can rely to help make their decisions appear both definitive and neutral
when candor is more difficult or risky," 185 most do not. Instead, courts
employ the rhetoric as a convenient slogan for capturing the idea that courts
can and should find the meaning of a relation in the context. 186 Instinct rhetoric
therefore seems to inspire or challenge most courts to elaborate on the
circumstances. Conversely, it also serves as a useful exclamation point when
courts have already engaged in a deep contextual analysis.
Cardozo stated that a message's literary style is a "tokeni] of the thing's
identity. [It] make[s] it what it is." 87 Studies in linguistics support and add to
this conclusion. They indicate that language shapes people's perceptions and
conceptualizations of the world.' 8 8 In general, the imagery evoked by instinct
184 Richard D. Rieke, The Rhetoric of Law, A Bibliographical Essay, in 18
TODAY'S SPEECH 49 (quoting BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL
PRocEss 112 (1921)).
185 SOLAN, supra note 8, at 4. Critics thought that "Cardozo's style served
largely to mask the basic subjectivity" of his opinions. Richard H. Weisberg, Law,
Literature and Cardozo's Judicial Poetics, 1 CAnnOzO L. REv. 283, 293 (1979)
(discussing critics). But Cardozo himself was aware of the dangers of language:
"Metaphors in law are to be narrowly watched, for starting as devices to liberate
thought, they end often by enslaving it." Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58,
61 (N.Y. 1926).
186 But see Lawrence Kalevitch, Gaps in Contracts: A Critique of Consent
Theory, 54 MONT. L. REv. 169, 182 n.33 (1993) ("instinct" reasoning is no more than
a "question begging metaphor").
187 Cardozo, supra note 6, at 340. According to Professor Weisberg, "style
inevitably contributes to, and often controls, the present and future meaning of
appellate opinions." Weisberg, supra note 185, at 309.
188 Steven L. Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning, and the
Cognitive Stakes for Law, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1141 (1989) (describing the work
of Paul Kay & Willet Kempton, What is the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis? 86 AM.
ANTHROPOLOGIST 65, 71 (1984)); see also Roger W. Brown & Eric H. Lenneberg, A
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rhetoric appears to have caught the judicial imagination and helped establish a
more flexible attitude about and approach to judicial decisionmaking. More
specifically, the language seems to have served as a "figurative discourse"189
for helping to legitimize the process of finding an obligation deeply imbedded
in the circumstances or creating one. Perhaps the perspective nurtured by the
instinct language even contributed to the willingness of lawmakers to
consolidate other theories of obligation such as promissory estoppel.190
Despite these apparent accomplishments, I cannot prove that even one
decision would have been different had the courts failed to invent the language
"instinct with an obligation." We saw that the use of the rhetoric was a
response to the dominant social and economic forces of the period. The time
was ripe for greater flexibility in contract law to respond to the realities of
long-term contracting and the turn towards legal realism. In the absence of
instinct rhetoric, courts probably would have created other language or referred
more frequently to existing doctrines to achieve their results. Indeed, the
parallel rise of the legal standards of good faith and unconscionability bears out
the courts' lack of reticence to create and use dramatic language to serve their
purposes. 191
Notwithstanding this uncertainty about the importance of the instinct
language, one lesson that can be learned from the rise of the rhetoric and
indeed from the triumph of good faith and unconscionability, is that an
important ingredient or catalyst in achieving legal change is the availability and
use of some powerful rhetoric to propel courts confidently toward new methods
and approaches. Examples from other areas of the law support this conclusion.
To move the law from the abstract and general "bad tendency" test for
determining whether speech received First Amendment protection, Holmes
devised the "clear and present danger" standard, which measured the specific
Study in Language and Cognition, in PsYCHoLINGUISTICS 481 (Sol Saporta ed., 1961);
DeLee Lantz & Volney Stefflre, Language and Cognition, 69 J. ABNORMAL & SOC.
PSYCH. 472 (1964). Legal analysts agree with this assessment. See, e.g., RICHARD A.
POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION 311 (1988) ("language
shapes thought . . . [the] choice of words can therefore have political and social
consequences. ... ").
189 Winter, supra note 188, at 1164.
190 On the creation and proliferation of promissory estoppel, see generally
ROBERT S. SUMMERs & ROBERT A. HILLMAN, CONTRACT AND RELATED OBLIGATION:
THEORY, DOCTRINE, AND PRACTICE 79-106 (2d ed. 1992).
191 But Arthur Leff complained that unconscionability was an "emotionally
satisfying incantation" signifying nothing. Leff, supra note 164, at 558-60.
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impact of the subject speech.' 92 1 have already set forth the penumbra metaphor
utilized by the Supreme Court in striking a state statute barring the use of
contraceptives by married couples. 193
The need for forceful, even emotional, language to support legal change
should not be surprising. Legal reform comes at a price. It upsets accepted
methods and manners of thinking about problems. It raises the possibility of
mistakes resulting in inferior law. The legal system's reliance on precedent is a
testament to the high regard in which it holds the past.194 To make a clean
break, even when logic seems to compel one, the legal community apparently
craves the comfort of emotionally appealing language. In this way, strong
rhetoric is like a starter motor that ignites the engine of reform. Such a use of
language may be illogical and emotional (legal change should be based on
substance not form), but it may be necessary and inevitable. 195
These observations suggest not so much why powerful rhetoric is either
good or bad, but why, as Judge Posner points out, it is inherently
controversial. Although I argue that instinct rhetoric generally illuminated
decisions and provided a vehicle for moving courts in a beneficial direction,
others may disagree. Theorists more oriented toward the certainty of rules and
the importance of freedom of contract may argue that instinct rhetoric only
confuses and licenses illicit judicial intervention in private agreements. In short,
powerful rhetoric not only has the potential to clarifyj, draw attention to, and
ignite beneficial ideas, but also can confuse them or, perhaps worse, facilitate
the communication of bankrupt ideas. 196
Not only does language affect a person's understanding and perception of
information, the nature of an idea influences one's evaluation of the language
192 Vincent Blasi, The Market Metaphor and the Freedom of Speech: The
Holmes Opinion in Abrams v. United States 27-28 (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author); see also David Cole, Agon at Agora: Creative Misreadings in the First
Amendment Tradition, 95 YALE L. 1. 857, 879-84 (1986).
193 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 0965); see supra note 156 and
accompanying text.
194 "[L]awyers and judges lack the freedom of artists to declare openly their
break with precedent or their disassociation with the forms of the past." Pratt, supra
note 12, at 428.
195 Winter speculates that metaphor may be "inevitable in legal analysis because
it is central to human rationality; it is a primary mode of comprehension and
reasoning." Winter, supra note 188, at 1166.
196 See Smith, supra note 53, at 12 ("[Plowerful rhetoric may contribute to the
force of a judicial decision, but it does not guarantee that the judgment is morally or
even legally sound.").
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presenting it. Language communicating a morally corrupt idea may appear
sinister and gratuitous instead of charming and interesting. Consider again
Ciufo v. Caufo, 19 7 where the court found that a marriage was "instinct with an
obligation" on the part of an abused wife to share her wealth with her husband.
At a time when the unfairness of marital inequality and the horrors of spousal
abuse have been exposed, the instinct rhetoric in Ciufo seems to lose its appeal
and to be rather hollow.
There is a second lesson to be gleaned from this study, then. It is hardly a
revelation but still worthy of a reminder from time to time. Although logic and
rhetoric are intimately connected, the reader of a legal opinion should be aware
of the distinction. 198 She should attempt dispassionately to analyze an opinion's
logic. What is the legal authority for finding an implied term in an agreement?
Is the legal authority persuasive? Is it on point? Does the opinion finding such a
term appeal to moral, economic, social, or institutional reasons apart from
precedent? Are these persuasive? Of course, in many situations, the admonition
to avoid, or at least be aware of, the emotional appeal of language may be
asking too much of fallible, passionate human beings.
IV. CONCLUSION
Justice Cardozo pointed out that logic and rhetoric determine the
"acceptance and ultimate authority of an opinion." 199 "Instinct with an
obligation" has strong appeal on both grounds. Instinct reasoning presented a
new avenue for avoiding formal hurdles to enforcing agreements at a time
when formalism was losing appeal and new methods of doing business
demanded more flexible law. As time passed, instinct reasoning presented a
methodology for incorporating nonconsensual norms in contract cases. Instinct
rhetoric was also an aesthetically pleasing alternative to the drab
197 60 N.Y.S.2d 848 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
198 "When the vivid fictions and metaphors of traditional jurisprudence are
thought of as reasons for decisions, rather than poetical or mnemonic devices... then
[one] is apt to forget the social forces which mold the law .... ." Felix Cohen,
Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REv. 809, 812
0935).
199 Richard Weisberg, How Judges Speak, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 50 (1982) (there
is a "symmetry in law between form and substance."); see also Smith, supra note 53,
at 11 (substance and form are "intricately related").
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conceptualism of most legal prose. In short, "instinct with an obligation" was a
rhetorical phrase that appealingly channeled the way the contract-law
establishment thought about contract law in the twentieth century.
